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Social Purpose Corporations:
The Next Targets for Greenwashing Practices and
Crowdfunding Scams
Tina H. Ho*
With an increased focus on corporate social responsibility,1 various states
have recently created a for-profit corporate entity that considers both social
and shareholders’ interests.2 These for-profit corporations, such as benefit
corporations, balance both shareholders’ profits and public interests.3 In
addition to corporations’ traditional purposes of profit maximization, these
for-profit corporations also strive to create public benefit to the community
and environment or even to the corporations’ employees, supply chain, and
customers.4
Washington State has followed this trend and created a for-profit
business entity known as a “social purpose corporation,” emphasizing that
the requirements and regulations related to this entity should be flexible in
legislating corporate behavior.5 Washington’s social purpose corporation
statute was intended to provide more flexibility than was afforded by the

*

Tina Ho is a 2015 JD Candidate at Seattle University School of Law. She would like to
thank the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for giving her the opportunity to share her
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1
Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research, and Practice, 12 INT’L J. OF MGMT.
REVS. 85, 85 (2010).
2
H.R. 2239, 62nd Cong. (Wash. 2012).
3
Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 13,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-char
itable-for-profit-entity/.
4
Id.
5
John Reed & Anne Wellman Lewis, The Social Purpose Corporation, STARTUP LAW
BLOG (May 8, 2012), http://www.startuplawblog.com/2012/05/08/social-purposecorporation/.
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comparable benefit corporation statutes.6 However, by allowing such
flexibility, fraudsters can utilize social purpose corporations for
greenwashing practices and crowdfunding scams. This article will discuss
the rise of greenwashing and crowdfunding scams, the reasons why social
purpose corporations are the next targets for these scams, and what
Washington State’s legislature can do to protect legitimate social purpose
corporations that benefit society’s welfare and to deter deceptive practices
and potential scams. The article will focus on Washington’s social purpose
corporation legislation because Washington was the first state to create a
social purpose corporation.7 However, the article recognizes that the
analysis and prescribed solutions in this article can be applied to other states
that have pending or recently passed social purpose corporation legislation.8

INTRODUCTION
Both “environmentally friendly” and “crowdfunding” are terms that have
gained tremendous attention in the general population in the last few years.
Specifically, environmental marketing has been growing exponentially
since the 1990s and there has been a drastic jump in the quantity of products
that claim to be environmentally friendly.9 However in 2010, “[o]ne green
marketing firm examined more than 12,000 different green advertising

6

Id.
Social Purpose Corporation, SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/
SocialPurposeCorporation.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
8
Only one other state, Florida, had adopted a social purpose corporation entity in July
2014. The one difference between the Washington and Florida legislation is that Florida
created both the benefit corporation and the social purpose corporation whereas
Washington only offers the social purpose corporation in lieu of a benefit corporation
entity. See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn & Stuart D. Ames, Now It’s Easier Being Green:
Florida’s New Benefit and Social Purpose Corporations, 88 THE FLA B.J. 38, 38 (2014),
available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/8c9f13012b9673
6985256aa900624829/c655f4f9d7d009b585257d7e004bcb18!OpenDocument.
9
Nick Feinstein, Note: Learning from Past Mistakes: Future Regulation to Prevent
Greenwashing, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 229, 232 (2013).
7
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claims and concluded that 95 percent were overly vague or unsupported.”10
Another report found that “of over 1,000 self-declared ‘green’ products
reviewed, all but one engaged in some form of greenwash.”11 Greenwashing
refers to companies making “deceptive, misleading, and false”
environmental claims.12
Crowdfunding has also gained significant visibility in the past several
years. Although crowdfunding has the potential to raise much-needed
capital for small businesses and entrepreneurs, it also creates a great
potential for scams. A well-known crowdfunding scam on Kickstarter is
“Kobe Red.”13 The project by Magnus Fun, Inc., claimed to be raising
money for a Kobe beef-based jerky business, made with 100 percent
organic feed- and beer-fed Japanese cows.14 In less than four weeks,
Magnus Fun, Inc., raised more than $120,000 from 3,252 backers, almost
50 times its initial goal of $2,437.15 Luckily, just hours before the monthlong fundraising efforts were to end and the funds were to be released to
Magnus Fun, Inc., Kickstarter suspended the fundraising campaign when it
was discovered that the project was a scam.16 Among other suspicious
details, Magnus Fun, Inc.’s promises and taste testimonials displayed on its
Kickstarter website proved to be fake and inaccurate.17 Further information
regarding this scam is mentioned in Part IV, Section B of this article.
Greenwashing practices have gone rampant and there are already
instances of crowdfunding scams nationwide and globally. This article will
10

David J. Gilles & Matthew T. Kemp, Greenwash: Overselling a Product’s
‘Greenness’, 85 WIS. LAW. 1, 4 (2012).
11
Eric L. Lane, Consumer Protection in the Eco-Mark Era: A Preliminary Survey and
Assessment of Anti-Greenwashing Activity and Eco-Mark Enforcement, 9 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 742, 746 (2010).
12
Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 111 (Cal.Ct.App. 2011).
13
Eric Larson, How the ‘Biggest Scam in Kickstarter History’ Almost Worked,
MASHABLE (Jun. 21, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/06/21/kickstarter-scam/.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.

VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 3 • 2015

938 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

argue, however, that the potential for both greenwashing practices and
reward crowdfunding scams has increased with the creation of social
purpose corporations in Washington. Because Washington’s social purpose
corporations have flexible filing requirements and few barriers to
incorporation, they will likely be the next targets for these scams. Fraudsters
may easily set up social purpose corporations with a broadly stated green or
social purpose and prey on novice green or social investors. Also, through
crowdfunding, fraudsters now have another vehicle for falsely obtaining
money that they would normally be unable to obtain from sophisticated
investors. In general, sophisticated investors are more likely to have the
financial acumen and/or awareness to discover a scam.18 Crowdfunding
portals such as Kickstarter target and cater to novice investors but provide
little to no protection for these investors. Kickstarter states on its website
“Kickstarter does not guarantee projects or investigate a creator’s ability to
complete their project. On Kickstarter, backers (you!) ultimately decide the
validity and worthiness of a project by whether they decide to fund it.”19
Part I of this article will introduce the concept of greenwashing and
crowdfunding. Part II will provide a background on social purpose
corporations, including their legislative history in Washington State. Part III
will outline the reasons why social purpose corporations will most likely be
the next targets for greenwashing and crowdfunding scams. Finally, Part IV
will offer multiple legislative solutions to deter both types of fraud.

18

Thomas G. James, Far from the Maddening Crowd: Does the Jobs Act Provide
Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for Securities Fraud in Connection with
Crowdfunding Offerings?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2013).
19
Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER FAQ, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kick
starter%20basics (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
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PART I: INTRODUCTION TO GREENWASHING AND CROWDFUNDING
A. Greenwashing
Defined by one source as “disinformation disseminated by an
organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public
image,”20 greenwashing is the practice of making one’s product seem more
environmentally friendly than it actually is.21 Another source defines
greenwashing as companies making “deceptive, misleading, and false”
environmental claims.22
Greenwashing occurs for a number of reasons, but it is mostly driven by
profits.23 Becoming environmentally friendly, or at least appearing
environmentally friendly, looks good for a company’s bottom line.24 Both
consumer and investor choices prompt greenwashing. Generally, consumers
and investors are more willing to buy and invest in products if they are
environmentally friendly and many companies develop goodwill for
developing a “green product.”25 Additionally, many consumers are willing
to pay extra for environmentally friendly products.
A combination of increased attention to environmental issues and
consumers who are willing to alter their purchasing habits has prompted an
increase in environmental marketing.26 Surveys reveal a “growing segment
of consumers who either reward or intend to reward firms that address
environmental concerns in their business and marketing practices and who
punish firms that appear to ignore the environmental imperatives.”27
20

Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate America,
23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673, 674 (2009).
21
Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. C-09-00927 RMW, 2010 WL 94265 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 6, 2010).
22
Hill, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 111.
23
Vos, supra note 20, at 680.
24
Id. at 674.
25
Id.
26
Feinstein, supra note 9, at 231.
27
Ajay Menon & Anil Menon, Environmental Marketing Strategy: The Emergence of
Corporate Environmentalism as Market Strategy, 61 J. MARKETING 51, 52 (1997).
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Many times, the first company that makes steps towards being
environmentally friendly can improve its market share through
differentiation.28 Once high-profile companies begin committing to certain
environmentally friendly policies, such as McDonald’s switching from
foam containers to paper wrapping,29 other companies follow suit, using the
high-profile companies’ actions as benchmarks for environmentally friendly
policies.30
The fear of bad publicity also creates an incentive for companies to
advertise green practices. Pressures from external monitoring organizations
like watchdog groups exert public pressure on companies to commit to
protecting the environment.31 In 2009, Kimberly-Clark gained negative
public attention for cutting down 200-year-old forests to produce its
products such as Kleenex tissues, while simultaneously promoting the
company’s efforts to reduce carbon emissions.32 Greenpeace proceeded to
launch an aggressive activist campaign against Kimberly-Clark.33 In
response, Kimberly-Clark released new environmental policies with the end
goal of ensuring that 100 percent of the fiber used in its products will be
from environmentally responsible sources.34
Additionally, there is a rise in green investors, who are specifically
looking to invest in companies that are green.35 Currently, green investors

28

Catherine A. Ramus & Ivan Montiel, When are Corporate Environmental Policies a
Form of Greenwashing?, 44 BUS. & SOC’Y 377, 388 (2005).
29
Feinstein, supra note 9, at 232.
30
Ramus & Montiel, supra note 28, at 386.
31
Id.
32
Feinstein, supra note 9, at 234.
33
Kimberly-Clark and Greenpeace Agree to Historic Measures to Protect Forests,
KLEENCUT WIPING AWAY ANCIENT FORESTS, http://www.kleercut.net/en/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2015).
34
KIMBERLY-CLARK, Fiber Procurement, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.cms.kim
Berly-clark.com/umbracoimages/UmbracoFileMedia/Fiber%20Procurement%20Policy
_umbracoFile.pdf.
35
Vos, supra note 20, at 682.
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control about 10 percent of the national market.36 Business scholars have
recognized that “[b]oth the analytic comparative statics and the numerical
examples indicate that the number of green investors in an economy does
affect the proportion of acceptable, unacceptable, and reformed firms in the
economy and the costs of capital of those firms.”37 For instance, when green
investors boycott certain companies, fewer investors hold the stock of these
firms, causing the share prices to fall.38 As described in one article, “[t]he
larger the market share controlled by green investors, the more expensive it
will be to be labeled a polluter.”39
Despite their best intentions, many green investors fall victim to
greenwashing practices.40 Green investors believe they are investing in
corporations that have an honorable social or environmental purpose, but
that is often not the case.41 According to Jacob Vos, “[w]ithout verifiable
information it is difficult for investors to make informed decisions about
environmentally responsible practices and companies.”42 The investors are
only able to rely on corporate representations to the public, which are often
major mischaracterizations of corporations’ actual activities.43 With nothing
to rely on besides the corporations’ own information, green investors end up
investing in many corporations with so-called environmental practices that
may not actually be helpful to the environment.44 However, many
corporations recognize this scenario as an opportunity to gain more

36

Id.
Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus & Josef Zechner, The Effect of Green Investment on
Corporate Behavior, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 431, 444 (2001).
38
Id. at 432.
39
Vos, supra note 20, at 682.
40
William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS.
ETHICS 253, 251, 254–55 (2003).
41
Id.
42
Vos, supra note 20, at 683.
43
Id.
44
Id.
37
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investors, and “[m]any corporations creatively manage their environmental
reputations for this very reason.”45
The issue with greenwashing is that “[i]f a company can reap the benefits
of a green reputation such as increased customer base or goodwill
reputation without actually investing the time or money to substantially
change its practices, the company is able to reap all of the benefits without
any of the associated costs.”46 Greenwashing “has become so rampant” that
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued standards known as “Green
Guides”47 pursuant to its authority to enforce Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), which generally prohibits deceptiveadvertising practices.48 Although not legally binding, the Green Guides
“reflect the FTC’s approach to evaluating environmental marketing claims,
and courts generally view them as persuasive authority.”49 However, even
with the Green Guides, greenwashing practices are still a common practice
within many industries.
B. Crowdfunding
In addition to greenwashing practices becoming rampant, crowdfunding,
as an internet-based fundraising model, has gained popularity in the last
several years. Crowdfunding is designed for “startups—businesses still in
their infancy.”50 In the absence of available start-up capital, small
businesses and entrepreneurs have started looking at crowdfunding as a
low-cost means of locating potential investors and capital.51

45

Id.
Id. at 681.
47
Hill, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 111.
48
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2005).
49
Gilles & Kemp, supra note 10, at 5.
50
David Mashburn, Comment: The Anti-Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s
Hidden Risks and Inadequate Remedies, 63 EMORY L.J. 127, 157 (2013).
51
James, supra note 18, at 1772.
46
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Crowdfunding is raising capital online from many investors, the “crowd,”
who each contribute small amounts of money to a single venture.52 The
“crowd” has grown at an incredible rate due to the internet and the
popularity of e-commerce platforms.53 A recent report by Massolution
stated that contributors across the world pledged $2.7 billion in more than a
million online campaigns in 2012, an 81 percent increase from 2011.54
Gofundme, a crowdfunding site with the current highest internet traffic, has
raised over $710 million for personal fundraisers.55
Crowdfunding is generally facilitated through peer-to-peer lending
websites, which are commonly known as funding portals.56 These websites
provide a platform for individuals to invest funds, both domestically and
overseas.57 Although there are several models of crowdfunding including
donation, lending, reward, pre-purchase, and equity/securities, this article
will mainly focus on reward crowdfunding.58 Reward crowdfunding portals,
are gaining popularity rapidly and there is no specific legislation regarding
the amount of capital that businesses and entrepreneurs may fundraise
through reward crowdfunding.59 This article will also discuss

52

Andrew A. Schwartz, ROUNDTABLE: Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 44 (2013).
53
Andrew C. Fink, Protecting the Crowd and Raising Capital Through the
CROWDFUND Act, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 3 (2012).
54
Bettina Eckerle, There Is More to Crowdfunding than the JOBS Act,
CROWDSOURCING.ORG, May 13, 2013, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/blog/there-ismore-to-crowdfunding-than-the-jobs-act/29050.
55
CROWDFUNDING FOR EVERYONE, http://www.gofundme.com/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2015).
56
D. Scott Freed, Crowdfunding as a Platform for Raising Small Business Capital, 45
MD. B.J. 12, 13 (2012).
57
Id.
58
Reward crowdfunding is a type of crowdfunding where individuals receive a reward
for contributing funds to a company. A more detailed explanation of reward
crowdfunding is provided below.
59
Although there are no restrictions on the amount of money a business or entrepreneur
may raise through donation crowdfunding, there is an understanding that the donors do
not expect to see any of their initial investment returned in social or public benefits.
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equity/security crowdfunding as a basis for the suggested additional
protections on reward crowdfund investors.
In donation crowdfunding, investors donate money to a cause without
expecting to receive anything in return other than a possible tax benefit or
satisfaction.60 This type of crowdfunding can raise large amounts of capital.
For instance, President Barack Obama’s campaign used crowdfunding to
raise about “$1 million a day, all online, with more than a million sub$1,000 contributions” to raise $75 million.61 Because investors in donation
crowdfunding do not expect a return, no need for increased protection for
investors exists, which is why an analysis relating specifically to donation
crowdfunding has been omitted.
Lending crowdfunding occurs when “crowdfunders” make loans through
websites, with or without interest, and expect to receive their principal
amount back in the future.62 Interest-bearing loans are securities subject to
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations and therefore must
be registered.63 One scholar estimated that peer-to-peer lending alone has
raised an estimated $1 billion in funding for small businesses and will likely
raise in excess of $5 billion by the end of 2013.64 Because SEC regulations
provide strict registration requirements and damage remedies, no immediate
need for increased investor protection exists, which is why an analysis
relating specifically to lending crowdfunding has been omitted.
In reward crowdfunding, investors receive rewards or products in return
for their investment.65 Rewards are tangible benefits that cannot be

60

John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg,
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
583, 588 (2013).
61
Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent Producers
Should Know About the Legal Pitfalls, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 15, 16 (2010).
62
Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 588–89.
63
Id. at 589.
64
James, supra note 18, at 1772.
65
Schwartz, supra note 52, at 47.
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security.66 For example, through reward crowdfunding, a business or
entrepreneur can give a thank you note as a tangible benefit for their
investment.
Reward crowdfunding through crowdfunding portal websites such as
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo has gained popularity since 2009, growing into
a $1.5 billion market in just a couple of years.67 In 2013 alone, three million
people pledged $480 million to Kickstarter projects, which is about
$1,315,520 pledged per day.68 As of January 2015, over 7.7 million
crowdfunders pledged more than $1 billion dollars to Kickstarter projects.69
One of Kickstarter’s larger crowdfunded projects, “Pebble,” raised over $10
million in 36 days.70 The largest Kickstarter project, “Coolest Cooler,” had
62,642 backers (crowdfunders) and raised $13,285,226, despite listing a
fundraising goal of $50,000.71 For reward crowdfunding, if the target goal is
not reached, the crowdfunding websites will refund the money back to
investors.72 Because reward crowdfunding does not involve sales or
transfers of securities, reward crowdfunding websites currently operate
without the SEC’s oversight.73
One example of a start-up company’s ability to raise large amounts of
capital through reward crowdfunding is Double Fine and 2 Player
Productions. Double Fine and 2 Player Productions raised over $3 million

66

Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 588.
Schwartz, supra note 52, at 47.
68
The year in Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2013/?ref
=footer (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
69
Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=footer (last visited
Apr. 17, 2014).
70
Pebble: E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstar
ter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android (last visited
Apr. 17, 2014).
71
Coolest Cooler: 21st Century Cooler That’s Actually Cooler, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/ryangrepper/coolest-cooler-21st-century-coolerthats-actually?ref=most_funded (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
72
Mashburn, supra note 50, at 139.
73
Id. at 130.
67
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in one month from more than 87,000 individual crowdfunders for their
game Double Fine Adventures.74 After its first eight hours, the
crowdfunding campaign reached its target funding amount of $400,000 and
surpassed $1 million in 24 hours.75 Crowdfunders were entitled to receive
different rewards based on the amount they individually contributed to the
campaign.76
Pre-purchase crowdfunding is identical to reward crowdfunding, except
that the reward is the item that is produced as a result of the crowdfunder’s
contribution.77 The reward may be a copy of the video game or book that
was created due to the crowdfunder’s contribution.78 This type of
crowdfunding is also not subject to SEC regulations because it does not
involve the sale of securities.
Finally, in securities crowdfunding, investors receive a share in the
profits or some type of security in the start-up.79 The security is an
ownership interest in the company.80 As of March 2012, “three thousand
investors pledged to invest $7.5 million when [unregistered] crowdfunding
[securities] becomes legal.”81 Until the SEC promulgates rules governing
securities crowdfunding under the Capital Raising Online While Deterring
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (CROWDFUND Act),
which will most likely be in October 2015, federal securities crowdfunding

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Schwartz, supra note 52, at 48.
Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 589.
158 Cong. Rec. S2, 229–31 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown).
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is illegal.82 However, Washington and several other states have enacted
security/equity crowdfunding statutes.83
As a brief overview of the national act, in 2012, Congress enacted the
CROWDFUND Act,84 which provides an exemption for crowdfunded
securities to the Securities Act of 1933. The Securities Act of 1933 requires
all securities to be registered with the SEC.85 However, crowdfunded
securities up to a certain dollar amount, as discussed below, will be exempt
from registration requirements. For the first time ever, ordinary Americans
will have the ability to go online and invest up to a specific annual amount,
dependent on their annual income, without having to deal with SEC
regulations.86 The purpose of the CROWDFUND Act is to provide start-ups
and small businesses access to a “big, new pool of potential investorsnamely the American people.”87 As a whole, the national Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) allows “private businesses to offer equity
to anyone other than accredited investors in exchange for funding.”88 The
Act’s two primary goals are (1) to create a low-cost method for small

82

Mashburn, supra note 50, at 130; Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
(Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?
pubId=201410&RIN=3235-AL37.
83
S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2014,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-c-s-delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-saveit-2/?_r=0; Washington’s Jobs Act of 2014 (HB 2023) http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents
/billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/2023-S.SL.pdf.; Rules promulgated
by the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions (DFI), the securities
regulator for the state promulgated
rules,
can be found at:
http://dfi.wa.gov/documents/rulemaking/securities/crowdfunding/proposed-language.pdf.
84
The CROWDFUND Act is Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS
Act). H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012).
85
Schwartz, supra note 52, at 47.
86
Barack Obama, US President, Remarks at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-billsigning.
87
Id.
88
Kara Scharwath, Top 10 Crowdfunding Sites, TRIPLEPUNDIT: A MEDIA PLATFORM
FOR THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE (July 16, 2012) http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/07/
emerging-next-generation-crowdfunding-platform-roundup/.
REGINFO.GOV,
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business owners and start-ups to raise up to $1 million per year from the
public and (2) to allow investors of moderate means to make investments.89
Although crowdfunding has funded and has the potential to fund many
beneficial and successful projects, the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) has placed crowdfunding fraud at the
top of its 2012 list of investor threats.90 The internet has afforded fraudsters
bountiful targets.91 The internet also makes it more difficult for investors to
know whether a business is legitimate due to the lack of real-life
encounters.92 In addition to listing non-existent projects or businesses, a real
threat is fraudsters posing as registered funding portals.93 For example, by
using domain names similar to legitimate crowdfunding intermediaries,
fraudsters are able to trick novice investors into investing.94 Fraudsters may
also indirectly solicit through spam e-mails and social media platforms such
as Facebook and Twitter.95 Therefore, the impersonal nature of the internet
calls for more investor protection.96
A renowned rewards crowdfunding scam is “Dirty Bird Sports,” which
sought funding for a new college football video game through Kickstarter
by offering perks for investors such as dinner with Jamal Anderson (a
former NFL running back), a chance to test-play the game, and signed
89

Schwartz, supra note 52, at 44.
Beth Pinsker Gladstone, Crowdfunding Scams Top Investor Threat: Regulators,
REUTERS, Aug. 21, 2012, 6:57 PM, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/21/usinvesting-scams-threats-idUSBRE87K17W20120821. Founded in 1919, NASAA is an
investor protection association of 67 securities regulators from the territories, districts,
and states of the United States, Mexico, and Canada. See Our Role, N. AM. SEC. ADMINS.
ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/our-role/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
91
James, supra note 18, at 1780.
92
Karina Sigar, Comment: Fret No More: Inapplicability of Crowdfunding Concerns in
the Internet Age and the JOBS Act’s Safeguards, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 473, 481 (2012).
93
James, supra note 18, at 1781–82.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1766 (2012).
90
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helmets from former Ohio State football players.97 The fraudsters stole
images from 3D modeling artists and set a target fundraising goal of
$500,000.98 In a short time, 13 investors contributed $685.99 The scam was
discovered when Jamal Anderson was contacted, and he confirmed he had
no knowledge of the project.100 If the fraud had not been discovered before
the money was released to the fraudsters, Dirty Bird Sports could have
gotten away with at least $500,000.
As illustrated in this section, greenwashing practices and crowdfunding
scams are occurring with increased frequency. Corporate fraudulent
misrepresentations and vague environmentally friendly purposes perpetuate
greenwashing practices, which negatively affect both consumers and
investors. Although the FTC issued Green Guides as a standard for
evaluating deceptive environmental marketing claims, it has no legal effect.
Additionally, with reward crowdfunding, there are no SEC regulations that
protect novel investors. Moreover, with the impersonal nature of the
internet there is additional cause for concern about scams.

PART II: SOCIAL PURPOSE CORPORATIONS
Above, the article explored two ways in which contemporary marketing
and funding sources have lent themselves to consumer abuse and fraud.
This article will now explore an emerging entity that will be the next target
of these scams—social purpose corporations. Below is a brief overview of
social purpose corporations in relation to Washington State.
While the primary objective of a traditional business corporation is
to create economic value for its shareholders, the social purpose
corporation now gives companies the latitude to also promote one
or more broad goals of social responsibility, such as environmental
97
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sustainability or committing to improve other aspects of the local,
national, or world communities.101
In 2012, after considerable deliberation, the Washington Corporate Act
Revision Committee created the social purpose corporation, making a
deliberate decision to draft a slightly different version of the benefit or
hybrid corporation than that adopted by other states.102 Washington was the
first state to have a social purpose corporation103 with only one other state
following suit, Florida.104 Washington intended for the social purpose
corporation statute to provide more flexibility to the socially responsible
entrepreneurs than that which was afforded by the comparable benefit
corporation statutes.105 The statute was not meant to legislate corporate
behavior.106 Rather, each social purpose corporation would be able to
determine what corporate behavior is applicable to it by stating its purpose
in its articles of incorporation.107 In turn, the social purpose corporation’s
board and officers may be permitted to attach weight to the corporation’s
social purpose(s) in making business decisions and would not be held liable
for doing so.108 The statute allows officers to make a corporate decision that
foregoes the typical shareholder’s profit maximizing value in favor of one
or more of the corporation’s social purposes as stated in the articles of
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incorporation.109 In June 2012, the social purpose corporation became
available as a legal business entity in Washington State.110
As of December 1, 2014, there were 132 registered and 101 active social
purpose corporations in Washington State, and that number is increasing
weekly.111 A social purpose corporation must declare its intent to produce
positive short-term or long-term effects or minimize adverse effects through
its business activities.112 The effects may be “environmental or social, and
can include the corporation’s employees, supply chain, customers, or the
greater community, including local, state, national, or world.”113
Additionally, a corporation may have more than one social purpose for
which it is organized.114
A corporation may incorporate as a social purpose corporation at any
time.115 An existing corporation may become a social purpose corporation
by approval of a two-thirds majority vote of stakeholders.116 A social
purpose corporation may also choose to no longer be a social purpose
corporation by a two-thirds majority vote.117

PART III: WHY ARE SOCIAL PURPOSE CORPORATIONS THE NEXT
TARGETS?
After providing a brief overview of social purpose corporations above,
this section will delve further into the flexible requirements and lack of
investor protections under Washington’s social purpose corporation
legislation. Specifically, the article will offer several reasons why social
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purpose corporations are the next targets for greenwashing practices and
crowdfunding scams.
A. No Barriers to Entry and Flexible Requirements
There are essentially no barriers of entry to form a social purpose
corporation. The easy, flexible requirements that a corporation must fulfill
to incorporate as a social purpose corporation will allow fraudsters to set up
multiple social purpose corporations and utilize these corporations to attract
investors. Social and green investors will not be as wary when investing in
apparent social purpose corporations, so they are prone to invest in
fraudsters posing as such. There is currently nothing in place to protect
these investors.
Only three requirements exist to incorporate a social purpose corporation:
(1) the name of the corporation must include “social purpose corporation”
or a version of SPC;118 (2) the articles of incorporation must state: “The
mission of this social purpose corporation is not necessarily compatible
with and may be contrary to maximizing profits and earnings for
shareholders, or maximizing shareholder value in any sale, merger,
acquisition or other similar actions of the corporation”; 119 and (3) a social
purpose corporation must have at least one general social purpose.120 The
corporation must “promote positive short-term or long-term effects of, or
minimize adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the corporation’s
activities upon any or all of (1) the corporation’s employees, suppliers, or
customers; (2) the local, state, national or world community; or (3) the
environment.”121 A social purpose corporation may, but is not required to,
include a specific social purpose. If the corporation has designated a
specific social purpose or purposes, this must be included in the articles of
118
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incorporation.122 Besides the three requirements above, the only other step
required to incorporate as a social purpose corporation is to pay $180 to
register the company with the Washington State Secretary.123
Additionally, the social purpose corporation legislation “seeks to impose
accountability measures while maintaining a level of flexibility to serve the
needs of each corporation.”124 The legislature maintains flexibility by
requiring the social purpose corporation to post informal annual progress
reports on its websites without any specific guidelines or requirements.125
Also, the corporation is given the legal authority, but not obligation, to
define its compliance with social objectives either by itself or through a
third party.126 Unlike other jurisdictions that have similar benefit or hybrid
corporations and mandate that the benefit or hybrid corporation utilize
third-party standards to judge the corporation’s commitment to its social
purposes, the Washington legislature decided not to include provisions in
the social corporation legislation requiring shareholders to adopt third-party
standards.127 Rather, the Washington legislature provided that the
corporation may decide to assess the corporation’s performance with respect
to its social purpose or purposes based on third-party standards.128 However,
by providing such flexibility and essentially no mandatory accountability
measures, the Washington legislature has effectively made social purpose
corporations an easy target for greenwashing and crowdfunding scams.
Also, because a social purpose corporation has flexibility in determining the
122
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weight a social purpose may have on any of its business decisions, it may
potentially place no weight on a social purpose while utilizing the valuable
goodwill that is typically associated with a social purpose designation.
B. Flexibility in Defining a Purpose
Washington State specifically does not require the corporation’s officers
and directors to consider stakeholders of the public and social benefit.129
Rather, the directors and officers may take these considerations into account
when making business decisions.130 The flexibility in defining the social
purpose is advantageous to legitimate social purpose corporations, but also
advantageous for greenwashing and crowdfunding fraudsters.
A common form of greenwashing occurs when corporations release
broad, high-minded environmental policy statements.131 For example, a
corporation may make a general commitment to preserving the
environment.132 Although the corporation does not identify specific
commitments or objectives, a high-minded environmental policy generates
good publicity and the corporation is not bound to produce measurable
progress towards its policy.133
An example of a corporation that marketed its broad environmental
policy is British Petroleum (BP), whose environmental policy is to strive for
"no accidents, no harm to people and no damage to the environment."134
However, it is impossible for BP to do no damage to the environment when
its business relies on extracting scarce natural resources.135 BP can continue
129
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to work towards an impossible goal while ducking any allegations of
perpetuating environmental problems by pointing to its noteworthy
environmentally and socially beneficial goals and policies.136 Also, by being
overly broad in its aspirations, there is no way for BP to be held liable for
not following its environmental goals when its practices are generally not
environmentally friendly. Similarly, fraudsters can create a social purpose
corporation and attract investors with its broad purpose and may avoid
liability from stakeholders or the general public.
C. Lack of Available Information and Novice Investors
In addition to the flexible requirements, social purpose corporations are
not required to disclose any financial information to the public and
investors.137 In fact, social purpose corporations are not required to possess
audited financial statements and fraudsters could falsely produce such
documents if requested or needed.138 Novice green or social investors may
not be as suspicious or wary of companies that provide unaudited financial
statements or that do not provide all the information that other more
developed corporations may provide. This is partly due to the fact that it is
normal for start-ups and small businesses to lack financial information
related to their business. Start-ups face limited “human, informational, and
financial resources.”139 Some suggest that “[m]any startups will not have
done enough business to have generated sufficient financial information to
disclose to potential investors.”140
Of primary concern is that, through crowdfunding, any individual can
invest in companies over the internet. Crowdfunding allows non-accredited
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investors141 to invest in start-ups and small businesses.142 Also, given the
multitude of online social network participants, online crowdfunding
opportunities will likely attract many unsophisticated, non-accredited
investors who may not be able to discern whether the listed project is a
scam.143 If sophisticated investors fall victim to fraud, then unsophisticated
investors need more protection and safeguards in place. Online
crowdfunding exposes investors to unknown financial risks and higher
incidents of fraud.144 Unsophisticated investors generally lack the necessary
business or financial acumen to understand the risks involved with
crowdfund investing or to understand in what they are investing.145
There are several service providers that serve a risk-reduction function.146
The providers, such as CrowdCheck, help investors make informed
investments and avoid fraud by reviewing potential investments.147
However, the cost for the services may exceed the amount to make it
worthwhile for investors to invest. Since crowdfunding deals with smaller
sums of money, expensive and detailed due diligence is not practical.148
Investors will choose to donate in order to support the company’s noble
goals without performing the extensive research typically done for
investments. Crowdfunding investors will rely either on the issuer’s sales
pitch or disclosed information.149
For fraudsters posing as social purpose corporations, the only information
that may be available to investors is any information that the fraudsters
choose to reveal. Fraudsters may choose to disclose the annual report
141
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publicly on the reward crowdfunding portal. Although the legislation
requires that the annual report be publicly accessible at the corporation’s
web site address, it only mandates that it must be furnished to the
shareholders.150
Nevertheless, the requirements for the annual report itself are broad,
requiring only a “narrative discussion concerning the social purpose or
purposes of the corporation, including the corporation’s efforts intended to
promote its social purpose or purposes.”151 Fraudsters can easily draft an
annual report to comport to this general narrative discussion requirement.
Although social purpose corporations are required to provide a social
purpose report, it is unhelpful without a way to verify the accuracy of the
reports.152 Once again, the Washington legislature suggests, but does not
require, information regarding the short- and long-term objectives of the
corporation related to its social purpose(s), any prior or future corporate
actions taken or expected to be taken to achieve the corporation’s social
purpose(s), and any measures used by the corporation to evaluate its
performance in achieving its social purpose(s).153
D. Lack of Legal Recourse for Investors Under the Social Purpose
Legislation
Finally, in addition to the flexible requirements, there are no specific
legal remedies available for investors under the current social purpose
corporation legislation.154 However, a green investor who believes that they
have been misled may bring a suit for fraud or misrepresentation. A
crowdfund investor may also bring a suit for fraud against a scammer.
Although some legal remedies are available to those who are defrauded, the
financial obstacle may be too large of a hurdle for investors to overcome.
150
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Because of the small dollar amounts in a crowdfunding offering, no
single individual is likely to have made a large enough investment for
litigation to be worthwhile.155 Investors may only recover up to the amount
invested, which for small investors may amount to less than the cost of
bringing suit in the first place.156 The limited dollar amount may lead to
investors filing a class action suit to pool together the claims of investors.157
However, the aggregate amount may still be too small to justify litigation
costs. One study asserts that “smaller sized offerings hardly ever experience
a securities-fraud lawsuit,” noting that less than 1 percent of offerings
below $5 million resulted in a class action lawsuit.158 Another study noted
that there must be at least $20 million in damages to “make the class action
economically attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys.”159
Because there is a lack of legal recourse, and therefore no punishment for
fraudulent behavior, fraudsters are effectively encouraged to continue to
scam investors.

PART IV: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This article would like to suggest several solutions below that the
Washington State Legislature should consider in order to protect investors.
A. Require Standardized Benchmarks and Third-Party Evaluations
The Washington legislature should amend the social purpose annual
report section of the legislation to require that all social purpose
corporations identify standard benchmarks and/or accreditation typically
used in the field or industry to evaluate the corporations’ actions in
furthering their social purposes. There should also be evaluations as to how
155
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the corporations’ prior and future actions towards achieving social purposes
align with the benchmarks. Specifically, there should be at least one thirdparty evaluation of the corporations’ progress towards their social purposes
with the results made public to the investors.
It will be more difficult for fraudsters to falsely create a social purpose
report if there is a certain standard or accreditation that needs to be used or
obtained. Additionally, by requiring legitimized reports, the proposed
legislative change will help investors become better informed. One scholar
proposed, “[t]he growing wisdom is that companies must produce verified
accountability reports—verified reports by auditors specializing in social
accounting and auditing.”160
Several suggestions as to what a good environmental report should
contain have emerged in attempts to address greenwashing practices.
Particular to addressing greenwashing practices, there have been several
suggestions as to what a good environmental report should contain. For
example, a good environmental report should discuss a company’s footprint
using quantitative metrics and cover the central environmental issues such
as air emissions, water pollution, hazardous waste disposal, energy
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and notices of legal violations.161
The FTC’s Green Guides might be acceptable benchmarks to evaluate
social purpose corporations that have environmental friendly purposes. The
absence of any required benchmark for a good environmental report could
undermine social purpose corporations’ legitimacy, so any benchmark
provided by the Washington State Legislature will be an improvement. As
one article states, “If for no other reason, with accusations of greenwashing
and evidence of its practice, decisions to . . . forgo the requirement entirely
strongly undermine an appearance of legitimacy.”162
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Additionally, the Washington State Legislature could use third-party
standards similar to those used to evaluate benefit corporations in other
states and through B-Lab.163 B-Lab is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization
that supports and certifies benefit corporations.164 Benefit corporation
legislation does not determine what third-party standard is acceptable and
appropriate and does not require the benefit corporations to adopt a specific
third-party standard.165 Rather, there are certain minimum requirements that
the third-party standards must meet.166 These include requirements that the
report must be comprehensive, prepared independently of the benefit
corporation, credible, and transparent.167
Currently, the goal of preserving a social purpose corporation’s flexibility
has left the social purpose report legislation too broad, requiring only that
the “narrative discussion may include the following information. . . . ”168
The legislation does provide some optional suggestions about what may be
included in the social report, but leaves the decision about what to include
in the report to the social purpose corporations themselves.169 Even if
Washington State’s legislature provides some universal minimum
requirement for the social purpose report, by not requiring a particular
standard, the legislature can continue to provide flexibility to social purpose
corporations.
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Arguably, by requiring third-party accountability, legitimate
entrepreneurs will not have the ability to personally decide whether they
have met the social goals they have set for themselves. Accordingly, it is
also hard to measure impact. However, by allowing corporations to pick the
third-party standard that would be most appropriate to evaluate their
activities, entrepreneurs can pick how they would like to measure their
social impact. The entrepreneur can also determine that it may be more
appropriate to utilize a combination of standards. Therefore, a requirement
that social purpose reports be accountable to third-party standards will not
negatively affect legitimate social purpose corporations.
Another argument that may emerge is that it may be too burdensome for
corporations to follow the extra benchmarks. However, other states have
created benchmarks and requirements that exceed the suggested benchmark
above and these standards have not deterred the creation of hybrid or benefit
corporations.170
B. Hold Crowdfunding Portal Websites Liable and Require Minimum
Disclosures on the Websites
In addition to revising legislation, crowdfunding portal websites should
be held liable for fraudulent activity or at least be required to take certain
precautions to minimize fraud.
In the earlier mentioned scams, Dirty Bird Sports and Kobe Red, it was
not Kickstarter, the crowdfunding portal site, that discovered the projects
were a scam. Rather, in the Dirty Bird Sports case, Kickstarter suspended
the project only when someone contacted Jamal Anderson and he confirmed
he had no knowledge of the project.171 Additionally, in Kobe Red, Los
170
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Angeles-based filmmakers who were conducting research for their
documentary film, Kickstarted, discovered the scam.172 The filmmakers
wanted to highlight successful crowdfunding projects and contacted
Magnus Fun, Inc., Kobe Red’s founders, through the “Contact Me” link on
its Kickstarter website.173 Several correspondences were exchanged
between the filmmakers and Magnus Fun, Inc., and after several suspicious
comments and announcements, the filmmakers hired a private investigator
to look into the company.174 The filmmakers published their findings on a
social networking site, and showed among other things that: (1) the
company was not registered in California as stated on Magnus Fun, Inc.’s
Kickstarter website; (2) the email used to register Magnus Fun, Inc., with
Kickstarter was the same as the one used to register another website—
Uhadme.com—which was removed; and (3) none of the taste testimonials
provided on Magnus Fun, Inc.’s Kickstarter website could be verified.175
Kickstarter’s essential avoidance of liability by stating in its FAQ section
that funders (investors) are responsible for evaluating projects’ legitimacy is
even more concerning.176 If something seems strange, it is up to the
crowdfunders to submit a fraud report.177
In the case of Kobe Red, ordinary filmmakers were able to discover redflag issues by performing minimal checks on the company’s name. This
would not be unduly burdensome for the crowdfunding websites. It should
not be up to the watchdog group or investors who have been scammed to
discover the scam. Instead, the duty should be placed on the crowdfund
websites to vet the social purpose corporations that may be scams before
they are placed on the website. A crowdfunding site may argue that it
should not be expected to undertake the due diligence necessary to vet all
172
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the projects listed on its site. Crowdfunding sites may argue that the
crowdfunding portals may eventually have millions of projects, and even
minimal checks may become unduly burdensome. However, because the
websites receive compensation for promoting the fraudulent organizations,
they should at least verify they are promoting legitimate investment
opportunities.
Under the JOBS Act, security/equity crowdfunding portals are held
accountable and are “subject to rigorous oversight” by the SEC.178 The
JOBS Act mandates that these specific crowdfunding portals need to
“screen issuers, educate investors, and track investor income levels.”179 This
mandate is only for security/equity crowdfunding portals and the reward
and security/equity crowdfunding portals are different portals. However,
because reward and securities crowdfunding portals list funding projects
and collect and distribute the crowdfunded money, the legislature should
consider treating both portals in a similar manner. The policy underlying
this provision of the JOBS Act seems applicable to the reward
crowdfunding portals as well: crowdfunding portals should be held liable
because they are repeat players that can handle regulation and can
accordingly spread the cost.180 Just as fear and awareness of the high
possibility of fraud for securities crowdfunding motivated Congress to pass
the JOBS Act, these same concerns should compel the Washington
legislature or even Congress to consider regulation overseeing reward
crowdfunding websites.
This article is not suggesting that a crowdfunding site should have a
fiduciary duty or strict liability. If the standard is strict liability, it would be
too expensive for the crowdfunding websites to operate and may discourage
them from operating or cause them to increase the percentage they obtain
from the listed projects. This standard potentially would discourage
178
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legitimate projects from listing their projects on the websites. The point of
crowdfunding is to provide start-ups and entrepreneurs a less expensive
option to obtain capital. This article is also not suggesting that
crowdfunding websites should have no liability. However, there should be a
responsibility for crowdfunding websites to take actions to reduce the risk
of fraud. Once again, the JOBS Act’s treatment of crowdfunding portals is a
reasonable guideline and framework for legislatures to utilize when creating
liability for crowdfunding portals.
Under the JOBS Act, crowdfunding portals are required to “take such
measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . including obtaining a background
and securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer,
director, and person holding more than 20 percent of the outstanding equity
of every issuer whose securities are offered by such person.”181
Crowdfunding portals are required to register and provide disclosures to
educate the investors.182 Also, these portals must ensure that each investor
(1) reviews the investment education information, (2) positively affirms that
he or she understands that she or he could lose his or her entire investment,
and (3) answers questions demonstrating that he or she understands the risks
of speculative investments.183 Finally, crowdfunding portals must act
reasonably and in good faith when fulfilling their obligations.184 Although
obtaining a background and “securities enforcement regulatory history
check” may seem too much for reward crowdfunding websites to take on, it
is reasonable to require that reward crowdfunding portals act reasonably and
act in good faith when listing projects on their crowdfunding sites.
There is a chance that crowdfunding sites may attract investors by stating
that they have vetted the projects before listing them on their portals. But it
will most likely never happen with the free market approach. Although a
181
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crowdfunding portal may attract investors by stating that it has vetted the
projects before listing them on its portal, there will be a limit to the amount
of liability the portal would be willing to undertake for listing
misrepresentations or fraudulent opportunities.
Environmental regulation is a prime example of an instance where
private market pressures are not helpful in bringing about an
optimum balance between current needs and the protection of
future resources. The market can be helped along by environmental
legislation if the legislation turns over the right information to the
market.185
Thus, the Washington State Legislature or Congress should create
universal regulations that hold online crowdfunding portals responsible for
the scams perpetrated on their portals because crowdfunding portals should
be held liable to the investors whom they attract to their websites.
Along with requiring the reward crowdfunding websites to act reasonably
and in good faith in listing the projects on their sites, the state legislature
should require crowdfunding websites to provide additional disclosures to
those who wish to invest in the crowdfunding projects. Merely alerting the
“crowd” that there may be some risks is insufficient. Most unsophisticated
investors are unlikely to read or take notice of required disclosures,
especially since prior history has shown that most readers ignore online
disclosures such as terms of service.186 The state should protect investors
and maintain market integrity. State authorities retain jurisdiction over
issuers or intermediaries in relation to fraud, deceit, or unlawful conduct.187
Mandatory disclosure of information, including the risks of a particular
investment, protects investors and is designed to provide investors access to
information.188 The CROWDFUND Act expressly preempts additional
regulations from states regarding registration or qualification of securities
185
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and crowdfunding offerings, issuers, or intermediaries before the securities
may be sold.189 However, because reward crowdfunding does not deal with
securities, there is no regulation that prevents states from creating additional
regulations.
Previously, Kickstarter only required that the project list the creator’s
company.190 After May 19, 2014, Kickstarter does list a verified name in the
creator-bio section.191 However, it is not clear from Kickstarter’s website
what process was taken in order to verify the name. Rather, the website only
states that the creator’s identity was verified through an automated
process.192 Although Kickstarter recently amended its policies, other
websites do not provide a verified name. This makes it extremely easy for
scam artists to use the name of the social purpose corporation itself to tug
on an investor’s moral conscience to invest in their scams. Furthermore, by
including a broad social or green purpose, the fraudsters will be able to
scam unsophisticated investors who are attracted to those specific purposes.
While there should be additional disclosures on the crowdfunding
websites, the SEC should not require as many of the disclosures as are
required under the JOBS Act because reward crowdfunding does not relate
to security/equity investments. Under the Act, Congress requires
crowdfunding issuers to file a disclosure document to the SEC,
intermediaries (including crowdfunding portals), and potential investors,
which includes the following nine mandatory disclosures:
(1) the issuer’s name, legal status, physical address, and website
address; (2) the names of the directors, officers, and shareholders
with more than 20% ownership interest; (3) a description of the
issuer’s business and anticipated business plan; (4) a description of
the issuer’s financial condition; (5) a description of the stated
purpose and intended use of the proceeds of the offering; (6) the
189
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target offering amount and deadline to reach the target amount; (7)
the price to the public of the securities or the method for
determining the price; (8) a description of the issuer’s ownership
and capital structure; and (9) any other information the SEC may
require to protect investors.193
Additionally, before issuing securities, issuers are required to file
disclosure documents with the SEC and make them available to possible
investors.194 The disclosure requirements differ depending on the amount of
capital required by the offering. Offerings of $100,000 or less require that
issuers disclose income tax returns for the last fiscal year and unaudited
financial statements certified as accurate by the principal executive
officer.195 Offerings between $100,000 and $500,000 require financial
statements reviewed by an independent public accountant, and offerings
between $500,000 and the maximum $1 million require audited financial
statements.196 Following a crowdfunding round, an issuer must file financial
statements and a report on the results of the operation with the SEC and
investors.197
This article suggests that additional disclosures should include, at
minimum, the following: (1) the project creator’s name, legal status,
physical address, and website address; (2) a description of the issuer’s
business and anticipated business plan; (3) a description of the stated
purpose and intended use of the proceeds of the offering; (4) the target
offering amount and deadline to reach the target amount; and (5) the annual
social purpose report198 if it is a social purpose corporation. The suggested
disclosures align with a few of the requirements listed above in the JOBS
Act. Although some may argue that the additional disclosures may be too
193
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burdensome for the flexible structure of legitimate social purpose
corporations, corporations that seek security crowdfunding would need to
meet the even stricter JOBS Act disclosure requirements. Even if they are
not receiving a security interest, because they are obtaining funds, they
should be able to meet at least the above suggested requirements.
Building confidence in the crowdfunding websites will allow investors to
invest with confidence. Similar to the Crowdfunding Accreditation for
Platform Standards for funding portals, there should be a similar
accreditation program to regulate reward crowdfunding websites.
Accreditation would be a “gatekeeper.”
One issue is that the crowdfunding websites have two masters: both the
issuers (who may be fraudsters) and investors. The websites do not
exclusively serve investor interests, similar to funding portals that may be
retained and compensated by issuers and also owe duties to both the issuers
and investors.199 However, crowdfunding websites should have more of a
duty to investors in order to ensure investor protection. Therefore, it should
be clear that the crowdfunding websites should serve to protect the
investors. Additionally, an investor may not be able to recover damages as
the fraudsters may be insolvent.200 The reward crowdfunding websites
should have some liability, and investors should be allowed to go after these
websites to recover their losses if the fraudsters are insolvent.
C. Limit Crowdfunding Investments in Reward Crowdfunding Similar to
Security Crowdfunding
Another solution, in addition to legislative revision and liability for
crowdfunding websites, is to limit the amount of money an investor can
invest through reward crowdfunding websites. Congress included a strict
199
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annual cap on the aggregate amount that a person may invest in
crowdfunded securities.201 For an investor with a net worth or annual salary
below $100,000, the annual cap would be the greater of 5 percent of the
investor’s annual income or $2,000.202 If an investor’s net worth or annual
salary is over $100,000, the annual cap is 10 percent of her or his annual
salary, up to a maximum of $100,000.203 Intermediaries may only release
the proceeds to an issuer when the aggregate capital meets or exceeds the
target amount.204 Intermediaries are required to ensure that no investor has
purchased crowdfund securities beyond their annual cap.205
The idea behind the annual investment cap was to ensure that the
investor’s loss would be affordable, ensuring that the investor would not
lose his or her life savings. This cap should also apply to investors who
wish to invest in reward crowdfunding projects in order to ensure that the
investor will not lose her or his life savings. By creating this cap, people
investing in the fraudulent social purpose corporations will not be
substantially hurt beyond what they can endure.
D. Hold Fraudulent Issuers Accountable for Plaintiff’s Attorney Fees
Finally, attorneys’ fees should be awarded to victims of fraud. Fraudulent
issuers should be held accountable for plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in order to
provide an economic incentive for attorneys to litigate. “Plaintiffs’ attorneys
must incur the up-front expenses of litigation in hopes of securing an award
that offsets the cost of litigation, while these attorneys can hope to recover
30% of the award.”206 Therefore, Washington State’s legislature should
provide regulation that the fraudulent issuers be held accountable for
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, after it is determined that the investments were
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obtained through fraudulent measures. This would provide an economic
incentive for attorneys to litigate a class action suit. Additionally, this may
also deter fraudulent issuers because they will have more to lose than just
returning the funds that were raised, especially if the investment amounts
are minimal. 207

CONCLUSION
Green corporations are important to maintain environment sustainability.
As one source stated, “Truthful advertising about goods and services is an
unequivocal social good. It reduces uncertainty and improves the quality of
decision-making. It facilitates search, promotes competition, and increases
the likelihood of consumer satisfaction.”208
Furthermore, crowdfunding is a new way for small businesses and
entrepreneurs to obtain capital, bypassing the traditional venture capital
route. It also allows small businesses to bypass the heavy legal, regulatory,
and practical costs of issuing registered securities.209 This fuels the
entrepreneurial investments and has potential for a huge impact. As
President Obama remarked, these entrepreneurial ventures are critical to
spurring the country’s economic growth.210
Finally, companies have seriously considered corporate social
responsibility when examining their reputations to consumers and the public
due to social media. Overall, consumers have increasingly expected and
focused on social responsibility by companies. In order to allow
corporations the flexibility to incorporate social purpose into corporate
values, state legislatures are recognizing a need to define a new hybrid
entity for for-profit corporations that want to promote one or more social
purposes. In the last two to three years and in increasing frequency, other
207
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states are adopting similar legislation to allow social entrepreneurs to
incorporate one or more social purposes into their companies’ missions.
However, if fraud is synonymous with social purpose corporation, society
as a whole will be ultimately hurt as legitimate social purpose corporations
have the potential to benefit society’s welfare. The idea of social purpose
corporations may inherit an unfavorable reputation and ultimately stagnate
the start-up market. Therefore, the Washington State Legislature will need
to add and amend current legislation in order to protect the investors. The
legislature should try to prevent fraud upfront rather than waiting for this to
become a substantial issue. Once Washington State’s legislature takes
preemptive steps to prevent fraud, other states may follow in protecting
their for-profit hybrid entities.
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